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Abstract: The article demonstrates both conceptually and empirically that PanAnglosaxonist 
knowledge networks reconstructed and reimagined an apparently de-racialised, scientific, sober and 
liberal world order that outwardly abandoned but did not eradicate the twin phenomena of racism and 
imperialism. Rather the new liberal (imperial) internationalists, organised in newly-formed ‘think tanks’ 
such as Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations, and through their increasingly global 
elite networks, mounted a top-down battle for minds at home and in the wider world. Operating in state-
private elite networks, they drove the movement to manage change and develop a new liberal world 
order particularly to contain panAfricanists who combatted the domination and exploitation of Africans 
worldwide. More broadly, we indicate that the pragmatic response to the extremes of Nazi ideology and 
a countering movement from the cadres of Asian, African and African-American intellectuals, anti-
colonial and anti-racist struggles within the national and global context, forced the Anglo-centric elites 
to promote change, albeit limited.  
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Clash of Pans: PanAfricanism and PanAnglosaxonism and the Global Colour Line, 1919-
1945 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Liberal internationalism, long celebrated as the incubator of the ‘long peace’ resulting from a 
rules-based order founded on an open, inclusive international system since 1945, was born 
fighting, is steeped in hierarchy, and saturated with mindsets that are racial, elitist and imperial. 
It was also initially conceived on the defensive, in a post-1918 world spiralling “out of control”, 
an Anglo-American hegemonic project/mission to manage, contain and channel fundamental 
change wrought by war, nationalism, anti-colonial resistance, and socialist revolution. Liberal 
internationalism, is frequently depicted as a progressive and idealistic era in global politics, as 
opposed to a panAngloSaxonist1 conception of power, was exclusionary and self-interested, 
and embedded within new practices of transnational elite power.  
 This article argues that the Wilsonian moment was also a Lenin moment, a Gandhi 
moment, Du Bois’s pan-African moment, and also influenced the development of Chinese anti-
imperialism, nationalism and communism. Hence, the responses of liberal (imperial) 
internationalists were a combination of offense and management, coercion and persuasion, 
violence, socialisation and incorporation. The article demonstrates both conceptually and 
empirically that PanAnglosaxonist knowledge networks reconstructed and reimagined an 
apparently de-racialised, scientific, sober and liberal world order that outwardly abandoned but 
did not eradicate the twin phenomena of racism and imperialism. Rather the new liberal 
(imperial) internationalists, organised in newly-formed ‘think tanks’ such as Chatham House 
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and the Council on Foreign Relations, and through their increasingly global elite networks, 
mounted a top-down battle for minds at home and in the wider world. Operating in state-private 
elite networks, they drove the movement to manage change and develop a new liberal world 
order. Additionally, counter-hegemonic assaults initiated by diaspora Africans combatted the 
intellectual, militarist and economic exploitation of Africans worldwide via a pan-Africanist 
offensive. The pan-Africanist counter offensive was rooted in the analysis of W.E.B Du Bois, 
the controversial and pre-eminent African-American scholar who stated that the problem, “of 
the Twentieth Century is the...…. Colour-line”. Du Bois, as did Marcus Garvey, recognised 
that race and imperialism had been interwoven into the very fabric of both national and 
international politics. Although Du Bois and Garvey were reared and came to prominence 
(first) within the “English-speaking world” i.e., the Anglo-sphere, they knew that its 
ideological foundations were erected on the concept of western and white supremacy. Thus 
from the early part of the 20th century the European diaspora was forced to contend with a 
racially defined movement that sought to reverse the global order that was arguably partially 
responsible for birthing it. Here we suggest that the pragmatic response to the extremes of Nazi 
ideology was preceded by an earlier countering racial consciousness from cadres of Asian, 
African and African American intellectuals, anti-colonial and anti-racist struggles within the 
national and global context, which forced the Anglo-centric and Euro-centric elites to promote 
change, albeit limited. 
 As such the world did not and could not continue in the old way – it had to be 
reimagined to project an image of change – of empire into commonwealth, imperialism into 
internationalism, overt biological racism into subliminal racism through ‘the silent war’, 
hierarchy into equality. But the story is messy and not linear (Furedi, 1998; Hobson, 2012). 
Negotiating and navigating change and ‘hegemony’ is a project that never ends as every 
component of the historic bloc, let alone its opponents and enemies, is actively engaged in 
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tussles for position. Ultimately this article will point out the internal and external rivalries that 
accompanied the clashes and quest for power between the Pan-movements at critical junctures 
in international relations such as 1919, 1935, 1945, and beyond. 
 The article is structured thus: it begins with a brief historical contextualisation of the 
era of western/white supremacy and the crisis that ensued with World War I and its aftermath. 
It then moves to examine the panAngloSaxonists who formed the principal vehicles for 
managing change and countering rival concepts and movements by describing the elitism and 
world views of Chatham House and the CFR, formed in Paris 1919 as two branches of a single 
organisation. It was those organisations that led the movement to reimagine empire as 
commonwealth, imperialism as internationalism, hierarchy as formal equality, and overt racial 
superiority theory transformed to “race silence”. Key founders of the nascent field of academic 
international relations, CH and CFR leaders agreed with Du Bois that the principal problem of 
world politics was management of the global colour line. The article then provides an outline 
of the worldviews and activities of pan-Africanists as they developed alternatives and 
challenges to panAngloSaxonist strategies. We present and analyse several cases of points of 
contact between the rival ‘pans’ to demonstrate their rivalries in action – at Paris 1919, with 
the outbreak of the Italo-Abyssinain war in 1935, and the deliberations surrounding the 
formation of the United Nations, 1944-45. Therefore, we conclude that the interwar years, the 
initial period in which the main contours of liberal internationalism developed, rather than 
representing a failed interregnum, represented the end of an old era of overt imperial and racial 
world order and ushered in an embryonic system that came to full fruition after 1945 – still 
racialized, imperial and hierarchical, but with a new language, institutional framework, and 
less overt, or formal, power. 
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 The first section of this article identifies the origins of the colour line and the associated 
attitudes of racial, cultural and religious superiority that helped fuel and rationalise Western 
expansionism.  
EUROPE, ISLAM AND THE RACIAL COLOUR-LINE 
Many mainstream discussions regarding the hierarchical social construct called “race” proceed 
from a familiar premise, whereby, European dominance in regard to non-white populations is 
couched in a manner implying their subordination could be attributed to their racial, cultural, 
technological and military inferiority. This is particularly glaring in relation to Africans who, 
despite the magnitude of Africa’s contribution to world history, have generally been 
characterised as playing a minor role (Walker, 2006; Asante, 2007; Diop, 1974). In contrast to 
this, Africans have been assigned a central role in Europeans’ racial discourses and the 
construction of the colour-line. 
 Although the colour line has been outlined by scholars and activists such as W.E.B. Du 
Bois, Winthrop Jordan, JA Rogers and Frantz Fanon, it is still frequently neglected in foreign 
affairs and IR scholarship (Ledwidge, 2013; Vitalis, 2015; Chinweizu, 1987). The thrust of the 
colour line thesis is that an ascendant Europe authored a complex power system that used their 
own phenotypical and cultural attributes to create a racial template to construct an overt and 
covert form of coding that could be employed as a discriminatory rationale to justify their 
pursuit of non-whites’ labour-power and resources (McCarthy, 2009, 24; Krenn, 2006, 6). 
Here, racism and white supremacy transcend the realm of feelings as they represent a functional 
set of behaviours designed to define and promote power relations to secure Europeans’ political 
and economic interests (Ture et al, 1992, 3; Ledwidge, 2014, 6).  
 While, most scholars trace the genesis of the racial paradigm to the rise of Europe 
during the 1400s, tensions regarding race and culture began in an earlier phase of European 
history. A key variable in Europe’s construction of the colour-line began in 711 AD when the 
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great black general, Tarik-Bin-Ziad, left North Africa, crossed the straits of Hercules (which 
were renamed the Gabel Tariq, the Hill of Tarik - the rock of Gibraltar) and commenced the 
Moorish conquest of Spain and parts of Portugal (Lugard, 1996, 29; Van Sertima et al, 1992, 
54; Jackson, 1990, 128).  
 Tarik’s actions initiated the several centuries-long reign of Moorish North Africans 
(Van Sertima et al, 1992; Lugard, 1996; Jackson, 1990)2 and Arabs over a “white” populace. 
Significantly European historians have under acknowledged the role the Moors played in 
introducing advanced scientific, scholastic and cultural knowledge into a relatively backward 
Europe (Karenga, 2002). Although the Moors did not impose a racial hierarchy on the Spanish, 
their Spanish subjects developed a religious and racialised Christian ideology that was anti-
African and anti-Islamic which fuelled their revolutionary zeal (Clarke, 1998, 28). Thus, with 
the strategic marriage between King Ferdinand and Isabella (1469) and the conquest of 
Granada, the last Moorish strong hold in 1492, the defeat of the Moors gave way to the intense 
colour coded, racial and religious purge exemplified by the Spanish inquisition (Clarke, 1998, 
28) that sentenced the Moors to conversion, death, expulsion and enslavement (Karenga, 2002, 
114; Van Sertima et al, 1992, 54; Jackson, 1990, 358). Spain and Portugal adopted an evolving 
racial worldview which when combined with the scientific, nautical and military expertise 
gleaned from the Moors, laid the basis for their militarised, economic, political, colour 
orientated and deeply ideological assault on the world. The enslavement, genocide and 
colonisation, that the Catholic and Protestant nations of Europe imposed on the Americas, 
Africa, Asia and the Pacific was uniquely infused with an imperialistic and racial worldview. 
 Despite fierce opposition from indigenous populations between the 14th and 20th 
centuries European nation states amassed vast empires. Arguably 1900, the date Du Bois made 
his signature speech regarding the colour-line, represented the zenith of Europe’s global 
dominance, the closing of the global frontier whereby imperial fervour would be unleashed on 
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other Europeans. Heightened greed and militarism precipitated deadly rivalries for the 
possession, access to, or retention of the colonies, especially as the stakes were raised further 
due to the rise of Japan and Russia. It is not an over-simplification to argue that WWI was an 
international crisis triggered by Europe’s complex system of alliances and the supposition that 
aside from Japan, Ethiopia and Russia all other non-western actors had been subjugated by the 
global system of white supremacy. The West plunged itself into a suicidal contest to establish 
which state or states would assume the mantle of global leadership, depleting its vitality and 
alerting their colonial subjects, many of whom had served in Western armies, to the tenuous 
nature of Western power (Lauren, 1996, 81; Furedi, 1988, 40).    
 White supremacy was an integral weapon in Europe’s imperial arsenal that in relative 
terms helped to unify whites against the racialised other. The idea (and practices) associated 
with the colour line were designed to convince people of colour that white power was 
unassailable in addition to preventing internal disputes between Europeans from destabilising 
the racial status quo (Ledwidge, 2014, 10; Roediger, 1995, 12). Still at no stage was White 
supremacy ever assured without the hierarchical imposition of power in all of its permutations. 
However in terms of success, British proficiency was noteworthy in regard to imperialist 
expansion and in the particularistic construction of an Anglo-centric depiction of whiteness, 
which provided the rationale for the creation of the Anglos-sphere (Krenn, 2006, 9; Vucetic, 
2011, 3). In particular the British and their WASP counterparts in America would adopt a 
calculated and covert approach to managing the colour-line in the aftermath of WW1.  
 
PANANGLOSAXONISM MOVES TO MANAGE IMPERIAL CRISIS, COMBAT 
RIVAL ‘PANS’  
The Paris Peace conferences following World War I and the Bolshevik revolution were the 
site, then, of global crisis management through the construction of new forms of international 
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organisation, and colonial redistribution and reform. Vitalis (2015) has ably demonstrated the 
imperial-colonial mindsets of American founders of the discipline of IR which was consciously 
understood as an instrument to comprehend and manage global “race relations”. At Paris in 
1919 were formed (what later became) the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and its British 
cousin, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA, aka Chatham House), two of the most 
influential think tanks in the Anglo-American world, which spawned imitator institutes of 
international affairs in Europe and the British dominions. Contrary to how we think today, 
identifying and managing the global colour line as the world’s principal division and challenge 
was not something uniquely emphasised by W.E.B. Du Bois but the practical preoccupation of 
panAngloSaxonist elites. The CFR and Chatham House, along with their colleagues in the 
Foreign Office and State Department, were at the very heart of that project.   
 This section of the article shows the elitist characteristics of the CFR-CH, their 
embeddedness in the broader social, economic, and political establishments of Anglo-America,  
and hence their representativeness not of popular opinion but the imperial-reformist-
internationalist sections of the political elite. Detailed studies show both their racialised 
outlooks but also their desire to sublimate racial hierarchies and issues beneath a veneer of 
equality and democracy, particularly through ‘internationalising’ or federalising overtly 
imperial arrangements. Empire was reimagined as ‘commonwealth’ – a state or community run 
for the common good rather than for the interests of the colonial power. The CFR’s journal, 
Foreign Affairs, was the direct descendant of its forerunner review, the Journal of Race 
Development, founded in 1910 to ventilate issues related to race relations’ management 
(Vitalis, 2015, 18). Much later, Chatham House spawned the Institute of Race Relations to 
think through problems of world race relations management (Furedi, 1998, 212). Chatham 
House itself was the brainchild of men who had helped construct the racist South African 
constitution of 1906, founded the imperial-reformist journal, Round Table as the organ of the 
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Round Table movement in 1910, and saw Chatham House as the direct continuation of that 
line of intellectual and political development. Cecil Rhodes had bequeathed the funds that 
fuelled the work of the Round Table movement, which had several of its American 
corresponding members at Paris – such as former Rhodes scholar Whitney H. Shepardson and 
George L. Beer. The Paris meetings that founded the institutes were not bolts from the blue, 
therefore, but the outcome of definite and increasingly significant reformist tendencies in 
Anglo-America – ‘new imperialism’ and ‘progressivism’, respectively (Leuchtenberg, 1952-
53; Lavin, 1995; Kendle, 1975).   
 A detailed elite backgrounds analysis of Chatham House and the CFR’s founders and 
leaders may be found elsewhere (Parmar, 2004; Shoup and Minter, 1977), but suffice it to say 
that their leaders were embedded in the upper echelons of their respective social, political and 
economic elites. Private schools, elite universities, extensive corporate directorships and links 
with the City of London and Wall Street law and financial firms, affiliations with all the main 
political parties, governmental, colonial and military experience, membership of elite 
gentlemen’s clubs – all feature strongly in the collective profile of CFR and Chatham House 
leaders. They were ‘Wasps’ – white anglo-saxon Protestants – steeped in colonial-imperial 
attitudes, experience and worldviews. They saw national and international issues as intimately 
related – and the nation state as an anachronism. Hence they favoured international 
organisation, but with Anglo-American power at its head. They were funded by major Anglo-
American financial institutions like J.P. Morgan and great corporate foundations – particularly 
Rockefeller and Carnegie and, later, Ford (Parmar, 2015). Wall Street and the City of London 
bankrolled the think tanks that several of their number helped to found, lead and develop into 
influential institutions in policy-oriented deliberations and elite and attentive opinion-
management (Lippmann, 1922). 
  
 
10 
 Hence, it is unsurprising that Chatham House leaders such as Lionel Curtis and Frank 
Ashton-Gwatkin were at the forefront of articulating their mission as managing a world of 
racial division and increasing racial consciousness – which was how they defined anti-colonial 
movements, as ‘anti-white’ movements that they feared would lead to a future race war in 
which whites would be severely outnumbered. Silencing and sublimating racial thinking and 
discourse, because they feared it would only cause further division by calling attention to the 
matter, and reforming empire into commonwealth, and transferring colonies into ‘mandates’ 
and ‘trusteeships’, therefore, became political necessities to meet the challenges of a radically 
altered world situation (Louis, 1984, 220). Ashton-Gwatkin, a Foreign Office official at Paris 
and Chatham House Council member, exemplified the panAngloSaxonist desire to maintain 
racial separateness but suppress discussion of racial issues. In a memorandum, Racial 
Discrimination and Immigration, Ashton-Gwatkin argued that although the issues of the 
Pacific were fundamentally racial, there was no real solution as races could not mix or live in 
equality – “one or the other must be the ruling caste,” he argued (Furedi, 1998, 4). It would 
take many decades and another global war before a Chatham House leader would admit that, 
historically, it was the “English-speaking peoples…[who] imposed on mankind a ‘race 
question’” (Arnold Toynbee quoted in Furedi, 1998, 27). 
 The two think tanks championed science and the scientific method to emphasise their 
objective and non-partisan approach but interpreted in such a way as to promote imperial 
thinking. Lionel Curtis, for example, when noting the direct continuation under changed 
circumstances of the mission of the overtly imperialist Round Table movement by Chatham 
House stated that ‘science’ was a mere tactic in the long-range endeavour to preserve the 
fundamentals of the British empire. Sublimating overt talk about ‘empire’, through terms such 
as ‘commonwealth’, became Curtis’s forte throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Lavin, 1995). 
International organisation played the same role. While international federation or Anglo-
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American federal union were advertised as above race, power and interest, their core remained 
Anglo-American and heavily racialized. For instance, Curtis and American pro-federalist 
journalist Clarence Streit discussed how to ensure over-representation of white English-
speaking peoples and the marginalisation of the more populous India in an international 
federation in the 1930s. After a long discussion of how to achieve that goal without exposing 
their racist thinking, which involved a thorough consideration of the means by which Deep 
south segregationists had stripped African-Americans of the franchise after 1865 – poll taxes, 
literacy tests, grandfather clauses, etc. – they decided that ‘individual taxable capacity’ as the 
basis of representation would place white, English-speaking New Zealand in pole position in 
the proposed federation. The “representation of the Asiatic countries like India and China”, 
they concluded, would be reduced to “manageable proportions” (Parmar, 2004, 68). 
Interestingly, even members of Chatham House criticised plans for federal union: experience 
of federal systems in South Africa and the USA had failed to improve black people’s lives; the 
new scheme “might turn out to be a great blonde beast,” according to Hugh Wyndham, a 
member of Chatham House’s World Order group (Parmar, 2004, 68). Barbara Wooton, another 
CH Council member, while supportive of “Anglo-American hegemony” preferred a broader 
based federation for tactical reasons – because of opposition from “a great part of the world, 
who do not see us as we see ourselves…” (Parmar, 2004, 68).   
 Curtis and the other founders of Chatham House believed, as Du Bois noted many years 
earlier, that “the great problems of the world now [1918] … are peculiarly problems of the 
Anglo-Saxon race” (Parmar, 2004, 61, 68). In 1921, Curtis went further and argued that “all 
policies in the last analysis now turn on the mutual relations of the white races of Europe, 
America, and Australia to those of Asia and Africa” (Lavin, 1984, 113). At the Paris meetings, 
Curtis argued that the best way to achieve the national interests of major states was through a 
conception of an international society, to advance a “universal interest” (Dockrill, 1980, 667). 
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Anglo-Saxonism was the view that “the civilization of the English-speaking nations was 
superior to that of any other group on the planet; and that the primacy of English and American 
civilization was largely due to their innate racial superiority” (Anderson, 1981, 12). Yet, Anglo-
Saxonism was always an amalgam of biological and cultural factors; in the post-WWI years it 
began to stress cultural superiority and inferiority as its fundamental characteristic, quietly 
sublimating its overt biological-racial aspects. By World War II, George Catlin, a close 
associate of the transatlantic federalists, argued that by “Anglo-Saxony,” he merely meant “a 
cultural bloc, with common traditions, habits, culture and (by and large) political views. The 
very core of that culture is a notion, not of race, but of freedom” (Catlin, 1941, 20). In practice, 
Catlin’s formulation expressed all the core assumptions of panAngloSaxonism but couched in 
the more acceptable language of culture and morality: where there was biological superiority 
and inferiority there now appeared cultural capacities and deficits, requiring technical and 
educational aid for development of the under-developed areas. 
 Chatham House founding and other British delegates at Paris confronted the changed 
world situation head on when Japan proposed a racial equality clause in the League of Nations 
Covenant. PanAngloSaxonists in Paris rejected the principle of racial equality – Lord Robert 
Cecil, head of the British delegation in Paris and Chatham House founder, regarded the 
proposal as a “painful amendment” while Harold Nicolson feared its acceptance implied not 
only the equality of the white and yellow races but also “the terrific theory of the equality of 
the white man with the black” (Nicolson, 1933, 145). But the tenor of the times was reflected 
in two responses: near-silence on the Japanese proposal in the West, but acclaim for Japan’s 
stand in the Afro-Asian world, propelling that power to symbolic leadership of anti-imperialist 
resistance. By 1935, W.E.B. Du Bois concluded that “Japan is regarded by all coloured people 
as their logical leader, as the one non-white nation which has escaped for ever the dominance 
and exploitation of the white world” (Du Bois quoted in Furedi, 1994, 27). By 1942, however, 
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State Department and Foreign Office discussions suggested that the 1919 ‘incident’ over racial 
equality confirmed the impact of race on international politics and implied that the issue of 
racial equality needed to be handled more positively (State Department paper sent to Foreifn 
Office, cited in Furedi, 1998, 45). But in 1921, Ashton-Gwatkin noted that Britain, the US and 
the Dominions were “all equally interested in avoiding a discussion of this subject” – as Furedi 
so insightfully observes, panAngloSaxonist elites “regarded racial thinking as having the 
potential to disrupt the world system…. A shift from racial confidence to racial fear,” on their 
part. Hence, any racial conflict would inevitably challenge the imperial status quo (Furedi, 
1998, 2). The ‘racial threat’, therefore, came from the unwillingness of non-whites to accept 
white leadership (Tinker, 1977, 131).  
 The transformation of, and in, the world system after WWI necessitated not only race 
silence, so as not stir up further trouble from non-white races, but also changing the overt 
language of imperial power and inequality. As mentioned earlier, while the essence of racial 
and other power inequalities continued, panAngloSaxonist elites increasingly devised new 
ways to manage imperial power and strengthen the bonds of union between Britain, its 
Dominions and the USA. One of those was to increasingly use the term ‘commonwealth’ 
instead of ‘empire’. Lionel Curtis was in the forefront of such efforts as was the Oxford scholar, 
Alfred Zimmern, who was close to the Round Table movement and Chatham House. To 
Zimmern, the League of Nations was a continuation of liberal imperialism and, with the British 
Commonwealth, they were the twin forces of order and peace through law, the champions of 
civilisation (Rich, 2002, 120). In addition, as Curtis argued, the League would also preserve 
Anglo-European power to retain tutelage over “those races who cannot as yet govern 
themselves” and, with American membership, “render obsolete the old pernicious idea of 
empire, rightly abhorrent to the American tradition” (Curtis cited by Mazower, 2009, 45). 
Beneath such schemes, as Mark Mazower argues, lay a note of racial anxiety – as articulated 
  
 
14 
by Jan Smuts in regard to the white minority in Africa – to be soothed by an international 
organisation of white great powers (Mazower, 2009, 48). The language of commonwealth – as 
exemplified in Zimmern’s 1911 book, The Greek Commonwealth, and in Curtis’s The Problem 
of the Commonwealth – elided the rather brutal fact that long-term white “tutelage” over the 
backward races was being sealed in a deal between white powers that did not want a repeat of 
WWI – a white civil war. 
 Race was indeed a key factor in the thinking and role of the nascent CFR at Paris. As 
the official history of its first fifteen years notes, in Paris were assembled thought leaders from 
“the same country and the same race”, the best combination for an agency to create 
international affairs public opinion “at once charitable, sane, and well-informed…” (cited in 
Shoup and Minter, 1977, 12). Several leading CFR founders were part of President Woodrow 
Wilson’s Inquiry – academic and other peace planners – and closely linked with the Round 
Table group – including historian George L. Beer, Thomas W. Lamont of the JP Morgan 
banking house, and former Rhodes scholar Whitney H. Shepardson (Shoup and Minter, 1977, 
13). Wilson himself wanted to avoid heated debate or publicity on any race questions at the 
Paris Peace conferences: “My own interest,” he stated, “is to quieten discussion that raises 
national differences and racial prejudices. I would wish them, particularly at this juncture in 
the history of relations with one another, to be forced as much as possible into the background” 
(Kawamura, 1977, 520).  Yet, the activities of African-American scholars and activists in the 
US and in Paris in 1919, meant that race remained prominent and helped forge bonds of 
solidarity between panAfricanists and Japan (Onishi, 2007). Beer had written about the 
necessity of an organisation of English-speaking peoples in 1917 although couched in the 
language of cultural affinity as well as a conscious attempt to move away from the concept of 
empire and imperialism to commonwealth. As he noted, “the first savours of command; the 
second of service: the one of servitude, the other of freedom” (Beer, 1917, 171). Decades later, 
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during WWII, CFR leader, geographer and Johns Hopkins University president, Isaiah 
Bowman, essentially continued Beer’s line of thought when he argued that, with the effective 
death of imperialism, newer forms of international governance, through which the Anglo-
Americans would exercise power, were necessary – which he believed was the future role of 
the United Nations (Parmar, 2004, 123; Parmar, 1995). In the aftermath of Paris, however, 
Bowman had already noted that future global expansion would be driven by economic power 
rather than territorial; the governance of the globe, however, would require Anglo-American 
hegemony within an international organisation (Smith, 1986).  
 
THREE EXAMPLES OF THE CLASH OF PANS 
The following section will briefly explore three examples to demonstrate the global contest 
within which the new liberal world order was forged; they span the inter-war and second world 
war years. 
 Furedi’s under-utilised study of imperialism and the global dimensions of white 
supremacy details the historical impact of the West’s evolving racial worldview. This article 
suggests that the broad mass of Western and Anglo-centric scholars have not acknowledged 
the imperialist and racial substrata of the current world order (Hobson, 2012, is a notable 
exception). Consequently, the counter hegemonic struggles authored by continental and 
diasporian Africans have been relegated to the margins of academic enquiry except or until 
they have threatened to disrupt the status quo. Therefore, it is important to examine the 
historical roots of pan-Africanism: which was derived from centuries of racial enslavement 
colonization, and the brutal appropriation of Africa’s mineral and human resources, which 
resulted in Africans mounting long term resistance movements and insurrections (Conyers et 
al, 2004; Geiss, 1974; Ledwidge, 2013). For example, the Haitian Revolution and other 
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insurrections within the Caribbean and North America help consolidate a counter hegemonic 
and self-affirming identity profile (Falola et al, 2015, 63). 
 Thus pan-Africanism was conceived by diaspora Africans robbed of their linguistic, 
cultural and ethnic identities, calling for the reconstruction of African identity within the 
racialized global context (Ledwidge, 2013, 25; Geiss, 1974, 11). The consequence was the rise 
of a small combative intellectual elite that challenged the intellectual foundations of white 
supremacy and propagated a gospel of African redemption at home and abroad (Falola et al, 
2015, 216). Early examples of this black intelligentsia were exemplified in the writing and 
activism of David Walker, Martin Delaney (Clarke, 1992; Adi, 2003; Clarke et al, 1974) and 
the Caribbean scholar Edward Wilmot Blyden who, in 1881, called for Africans throughout 
the world to reclaim their Africaness’(Clarke, 1992, 27). The actions of the Black intelligentsia 
were the equivalent3 of those of the Western and Anglo-Saxon power elitewho had constructed 
and utilised a behaviourist racial power paradigm; likewise black intellectuals formulated a 
race-first transnational identity dedicated to the protection of African interests.  
 The black intelligentsia challenged the West’s propaganda that Africans had no history; 
and the deliberate denigration of the global African personality. In short like Fanon, Cabral, 
Chinweizu and other Africanist theorists, the early pan-Africanists recognised that the 
territorial parameters of African liberation must include the decolonisation of the African mind 
(Falola et al, 2015; Geiss, 1974; Chinweizu, 1987). Interestingly those activists responsible for 
popularising pan-Africanism hailed from the Caribbean (Clarke et al, 1974; Conyers et al, 
2004; James, 2000). Ironically as the 19th Century came to a close diasporian Africans were 
constructing their race first power base, while the transnational white elite were preoccupied 
with the collective fears of an impending apocalyptical “race war” which they concluded 
threatened the status and existence of the white race. Consequently, the pan-Anglosaxonist 
white elite chose to adopt a modern brand of racism that invalidated the conspicuous 
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propagation of white supremacy in favour of a covert liberal variant to consolidate white 
power; whilst simultaneously negating non-whites efforts to construct their own organic 
counter hegemonic theories of power like pan-Africanism.  
 In 1900, H. Slyvester Williams, a Trinidadian lawyer, coined the term pan-Africanism 
as a anti-colonial theory of International Relations at the first pan-African Conference, held in 
London (Ledwidge, 2013, 26; Plummer, 1996, 14). During the conference, W.E.B. Du Bois 
announced that ‘the problem of the 20th Century is the problem of the Colour-line’ (Adi et al, 
2003, 48). Although Williams failed to build the international pan-Africanist organisation he 
desired, he sounded the war horn that helped to propel Du Bois’ and Marcus Garvey’s forays 
into international relations. In addition Du Bois’ internationalism helped spawn the creation of 
an African American foreign affairs network from 1900 through to the 1960s and beyond that 
played an evolving role in international politics (Ledwidge, 2013).   
 Although Du Bois has been credited as the father of pan-Africanism notwithstanding 
the role of Williams, the Jamaican born Marcus Garvey surpassed Du Bois’ organisational 
efforts as a result of founding the United Negro Improvement Association (in Jamaica July 
20th 1914), which popularised a transnational, race first brand of pan-Africanism (Meier et al, 
1985). Unlike Du Bois’ efforts to receive great power patronage, Garvey asked the question 
where is the Blackman’s government and set out to build one. Garvey’s vision of African 
liberation called for the destruction of white supremacy and the radical reconstruction of global 
politics (Blaisdell, 2004). Du Bois’ elitist brand of pan-Africanism, conversely, was geared to 
persuading the white power elite to grant him entry into the establishment, explaining his post 
WWI request for entry into the 1919 peace talks in Paris (Ledwidge, 2013). Du Bois wanted to 
win concessions for the masses of colonised Africans everywhere including those in the United 
States (Ledwidge, 2013). Ideological differences aside, Garvey and Du Bois both intended to 
influence the directions of the discussions at the League of Nations, and the Paris peace talks.  
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 The post WWI context had placed limitations on white supremacy and pan-
Anglosaxonism which was imperilled due to challenges initiated by non-state actors along with 
protestations from Japan and China. For pan-Africanists the advantages derived from state 
power were non-existent as western imperialism had conquered all but three quasi-independent 
black Nations i.e. Haiti, Liberia and Ethiopia. Therefore unlike the elite power brokers of the 
pan-Anglo-Saxon and Western world the pan-Africanists had no state power through which 
they could advance their political agenda. Therefore paradoxically the reformist and radical 
pan-Africanists were reliant on appeals to the transnational white establishment committed to 
the maintenance of white hegemony. Unsurprisingly the UNIA and Du Bois, who were acting 
on behalf of the NAACP, received no significant support from the great powers. For example 
the UNIA sent a representative to the Peace Conference and assembled an African American 
delegation to petition the League of Nations, which included Monroe Trotter’s National Equal 
Rights League, A. Phillip Randolph and Ida B. Wells; (Ledwidge, 2013, 36) but were ignored 
by the Wilson administration, the peacemakers, and the League of Nations. Decisively, the US 
State Dept. refused to issue the UNIA delegation with passports to travel to Europe. On the 
other hand, Du Bois was summoned to Washington DC by President Wilson’s confidant 
Colonel House to discuss his plan to obtain six visas to enable African Americans to lobby at 
the peace conference in order to promote their pan-African agenda; subsequently aided by the 
white led NAACP Du Bois travelled to Paris in an attempt to gain access to the peace 
conference and to hold his own pan-African Congress. Nonetheless, faced with some 
obstructionism, Du Bois skilfully bypassed it by utilising his pan-Africanist network via the 
black French politician Blaise Diagne who persuaded the French Prime Minister G. 
Clemenceau to permit the pan-African Congress to meet in Paris, with attendees mainly from 
colonised Africa (Clarke, 1992, 216). 
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 Clemenceau demonstrated his soft power acumen by shrewdly differentiating France 
from the other Great powers by appearing to suggest that France was more racially progressive. 
Overall the UNIA and Du Bois were neutralised by the pan-Anglo-Saxonist elites within the 
British and American governments, who instigated counter intelligence plots that neutralised 
Marcus Garvey and crippled the UNIA (Kornweibel, 1998; Lewis, 2000). Although Du Bois 
had been treated to a private audience with Colonel House in Washington, eventually like 
Garvey Du Bois fell out of favour with the NAACP which led to his resignation in 1934 for 
daring to promote a form of black separatism (Lewis, 2000, 567)4, in addition his radicalism 
led to years of harassment from the US government5. 
 
ITALO-ETHIOPIAN WAR 
A second example of a clash between the pan-African and pan-Anglosaxonist networks 
occurred in 1934 as a result of Mussolini’s desire to avenge white Italy’s cataclysmic loss to 
Menelik II at Adowa in 1896, by instigating the second Italo-Ethiopian War. Mussolini’s 
invasion exemplified the aggressive aims of white supremacy and Italy’s quest to enhance its 
imperial status. For Africans cross the globe the assault on Ethiopia was an assault on African 
independence and a testament to Europe’s incessant thirst for African resources. African 
Americans viewed the war through a racial, historical, cultural and religious lens that provoked 
both outrage and a desire to defend their racial honor. Italy’s racial imperialism was 
unsurprising to non-whites, as the League’s rejection of Japan’s racial equality clause had 
signaled the West’s continued support for the color line. Equally, Anglo-French inertia 
regarding Italy’s attack on the principle of sovereignty reflected their efforts to appease Italy 
and their belief in racial hierarchy, hence the League’s failure to assist Ethiopia was consistent 
with the views of two of its most important members (Ledwidge, 2013).  
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 In America, neutrality laws and the ethno-centric biases of the WASP elite within the 
foreign policy establishment and white America helped entrench support for the international 
colour line. Predictably, the executive branch leaned on the language of neutrality and ignored 
the fact that America’s racial subjugation of African Americans was consistent with the racial 
subjugation of Africans in Africa. Henceforth African Americans championed the defense of 
Ethiopian sovereignty. In short African Americans and the AAFAN’s defense of Ethiopia was 
predicated on a racial and pan-Africanist ethos, which found expression via their efforts to 
boycott Italian-American businesses, to provide medical supplies and recruit African 
Americans to fight for Ethiopia (Ledwidge, 2013, 47). African Americans also founded an 
array of new organizations which coexisted with and built on the fragments of the Garveyite 
and pan-Africanist movements. Notably the Black press’ analysis of the War presented a pan-
Africanist and anti-imperialist critique that highlighted the racial dynamics of international 
relations. Unsurprisingly, Du Bois and Garvey pointed to the conspiratorial character of Great 
power politics, which acquiesced in Italy’s imperialist and racial agenda.  
 Irrespective of mainstream ideological considerations the WASP contingent in the U.S. 
foreign policy establishment was predisposed to ignore African Americans’ efforts to safeguard 
Ethiopian sovereignty. The executive branch preached the virtues of strict neutrality laws in 
order to legitimize their failure to protect the national integrity of Ethiopia. For example, the 
CFR and the U.S. government ignored the lobbying efforts of the Ethiopian Research Council, 
backed by Howard University Africanist Leo Hansberry, Malaku Bayen, cousin of Haile 
Selassie, and political scientist Ralph Bunche (Ledwidge, 2013, 49). Overall the US 
government stifled Haile Selassie’s attempts to secure economic or military assistance from 
Americans and specifically ceased African American attempts to fight on behalf of Ethiopia, 
with secretary of state Cordell Hull halting military recruitment (Ledwidge, 2013, 59). 
However, under pressure from Italian American lobbies, the Roosevelt administration allowed 
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Italian Americans to provide substantial economic and military aid to Italy (Ledwidge, 2013). 
The racial privileges of Italian Americans, neutrality laws and the racial worldview of the U.S. 
government, coincided with the imperialist and racial logic of the League and the Great Powers. 
Therefore the lamentations of African Americans and the pan-Africanist ideals of the global 
African constituency were eclipsed by the West’s power politics and its allegiance to 
maintaining the colour-line in international politics.  
 
UN FORMATION 
The term WWII obscures the argument that the conflict was generally caused by acute rivalries 
between European nation States. Indeed, Du Bois highlighted its imperialist roots in centuries 
of racial oppression and the combatants’ desire to become the global hegemon (Lewis, 2000; 
Plummer, 1996, Adi et al, 2001). Prior to America’s entry into the war, the African American 
foreign affairs network (AAFAN) depicted it as an internecine war between white supremacists 
and an ascendant Japan; but over time Nazi ideology and the allies’ alleged commitment to the 
Four Freedoms secured most African Americans support for the war. African American support 
was confirmed by their adoption of a transnational agenda called the Double V campaign that 
demanded racial equality for black people in America and abroad. In brief the African 
American foreign affairs network won concessions during the war and planned to lobby 
delegates to support the formal ratification of a racial equality clause at the Dumbarton Oaks 
peace talks and in San Francisco in regard to the formation of the United Nations Organisation.  
 In contrast to the previous two cases, African Americans’ increased proximity to state 
actors during the War softened their calls for transnational racial equality and decolonization, 
as pan-Africanism was deemed too controversial even if partially acceptable (to black 
America). Such moderated positions won direct talks with US officials: Ralph Bunche attended 
the conference and “assisted the construction of ‘US policy in the colonies” (Ledwidge, 2013, 
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97). In addition the Council of African Affairs (CAA) which was founded in 1939 by Max 
Yeagan and Paul Robeson who were granted access to Henry S. Villard (head of the State 
Department’s Division of African affairs), who “promised to consider…the CAA’S 
recommendations to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in relation to Africa” (Ledwidge, 2013, 
97). Nevertheless despite African Americans’ call for universal racial equality and 
decolonization, the Dumbarton Oaks accords ignored the colonial issue and enshrined the 
principle that the proposed UN Security Council would only accept “petitions from sovereign 
states” (Ledwidge, 2013, 98). In short the conference accords pursued a liberal internationalist 
agenda that prioritized the needs of America’s WASP contingent, the Anglo-sphere and the 
Western power elite to attempt to keep American and global race relations and even 
colonialism outside of the purview of the Security Council’s mandate.  
 The battle reconvened at San Francisco (April 1945) as African Americans and their 
various organizations braced themselves for another campaign to influence racially 
conservative Western elites. The African Americans’ chief goal was to force the great powers 
to insert a pragmatic human rights/racial clause within the UN charter. The American 
establishment demonstrated its narrow vision of foreign affairs by sending an all-white 
delegation to the UN conference. Still, efforts for black inclusion at the UN conference paid 
off as the government officially requested that the NAACP send three delegates i.e. Du Bois, 
Walter White and Mary McCleod Bethune, all of whom became official consultants to the US 
delegation. While the selection of three African American consultants appeared promising, the 
more discerning members of the black intelligentsia noted that the NAACP was not a black or 
militant activist organization (Plummer, 1996, 150). Nonetheless the evidence indicates that 
the consultants pushed the US delegation to insert a clause that prohibited discrimination on 
the grounds of “Race, language, religion, or sex” (Lauren, 1996). Additionally the Soviet Union 
orchestrated an important strategy of underlining the US-France-Britain’s abysmal record on 
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racial issues and colonialism. In short the Soviets’ anti-imperialist and anti-racist rhetoric was 
designed to undermine the capitalist system and to win allies in the non-white world.  
 Ultimately, the pan-Anglosaxonists and racial imperialists may have softened their 
language and made some outward concessions to the mythical post racial world but: The US 
and West ensured that the UN charter did not sanction the UN to intervene to end colonialism 
or racial inequality in America (Lauren, 1996; Ledwidge, 2013). Nevertheless, the language of 
white supremacy was toned down after WWII and moderate African Americans such as Walter 
White and Ralph Bunche were incorporated into the foreign policy establishment. The principle 
of state sovereignty was used as smoke screen to prevent the UN from having the power to 
intrude into America’s domestic race relations or to interfere with the West’s colonial holdings 
in Africa and Asia. In brief, African Americans’ efforts to dismantle pan-Anglosaxonism and 
the West’s racial imperialism were skillfully blocked by transnational elites who profited from 
the colour line that existed in America and throughout the Anglos-sphere abroad. Thus in all 
three clashes the pan-Africanist intelligentsia was unable to dislodge its Anglo-Saxon 
counterpart. In fact, in the final analysis, the pan-Africanist concept was generally abandoned 
in favor of a more palatable conception of international affairs, more amenable to the post war 
brand of liberal internationalism.  
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Post-1918 liberal internationalism represented a new form of racialized struggle by 
panAngloSaxonists against, among others, panAfricanists, to manage and channel resistance 
in a changing world, and develop new imaginaries for a post-racial and post-empire world 
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order. However, as we show above, what was abandoned was the outer shell of the racialized 
global order via subtle language shifts – such as from empire to commonwealth and 
imperialism to internationalism and by substituting notions of race for what amounted to 
cultural imperialism. That was still tacitly or otherwise conjoined to the racial power paradigm. 
The shift in actual power relations was less significant and would require violent anti-colonial 
wars featuring massive casualties among colonial peoples and domestic movements for change 
that featured both non-violent and revolutionary movements subjected to massive and violent 
resistance from racial majorities. In short, the foundations of the contemporary liberal world 
order were built on the conceptual sturdy pillars of violent and non-violent struggle and 
intellectual combat. Western dominance derived from a violent, racial, hierarchical and 
imperial order that arguably remains deeply entrenched in the current power dynamics of global 
politics and continues to influence the ways in which the West views “the rise of the rest” 
(Turner, 2014).  
 
 
  
 
  
1 The term is used from a behaviourist perspective focused on the actual behaviour of elite 
Anglo-saxonists who, by definition, placed both overt and covert boundaries in relation to the 
creation of an elite and white network. We are not suggesting that pan-Anglo-Saxonism was a 
label those people assigned to themselves. Anglosaxonists were prepared to establish working 
relationship with other elite groups identified as white, while confining non-whites to the 
periphery of their ideological, racial and civilizational network in accordance with the racial, 
political and cultural status quo. Therefore, our use of the term provides an objective label to 
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highlight the beliefs and actions of the aforementioned group as opposed to asserting that the 
aforementioned group outwardly adopted the term. 
2 Which included two distinctly African dynasties the Almohad and Almoravids.  
3 Note unlike the Europeans the PanAfricanist model of power did not include the construction 
of a doctrine of racial supremacy.  
4 However, Du Bois returned to the NAACP as director of special research from 1944 to 1948 
http://www.naacp.org/pages/naacp-history-w.e.b.-dubois.  
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